Sanctions in an Anarcho

Date: August 08, 2000 02:50 AM
Author: Anarcho-Kev (Kevin4VFT@aol.com)
Subject: Answers for Real Questions

You ask some good questions, questions I've wrestled with, questions I think are important and need answering, and I would love to post my own answers to your questions and get some feedback. But if your questions are simply a rhetorical way of saying "Here's what I believe and there's nothing you can say to change my mind," well, I won't bother answering your questions. Just let me know.

I would be happy to discuss the connection between Romans 12 and 13. I've done some of that here:

Just as FJet seems to confuse "force" and "violence," I can see that we (pacifists) need to clarify the distinction between "sanctions," "punishment," "retribution," "vengeance," "restitution," and similar terms, and explain how these would function in a world under God's Law, without a State, and without Levitical blood shedding. I would love to get into a discussion of these words.

So whaddya say, Ed? Are you interested? Or were your questions merely rhetorical?

Kevin C.
http://members.aol.com/VF95Theses/paradigm.htm
---------------------------------------------

And they shall beat their swords into plowshares
and sit under their Vine & Fig Tree.
Micah 4:1-7

Date: August 09, 2000 12:03 AM
Author: Anarcho-Kev (Kevin4VFT@aol.com)
Subject: Sanctions, Monopoly, and Vengeance

Of course, if Ed imposes a sanction against FJet which FJet thinks is unBiblical, FJet may impose a sanction on Ed. Ed better get wise counsel.

Is there a danger that everybody is going to start imposing "sanctions" on each other? No, it hasn't happened so far. Even the various states have tended to execute sparingly, reserving their vengeful desires for planned famines and genocidal wars. The danger of sinful imposition of sanctions is no greater than the danger of sinful omission of imposition.

The Bible does not grant the State a monopoly on executions. I have attempted to answer objections to non-monopolistic non-statist executions on this page rat here.

FJet raised questions from the five-point covenant model: representation and sanctions. I disagree with these two points of the model. Sutton's formulation is not the only possible formulation.

Representation/Hierarchy · FJet is asking, "WHO imposes sanctions?" The second point of the covenant model does not necessarily answer this question. M.G. Kline's model has for the second point "history" rather than "representation" or "hierarchy." In other words, the first point is that God is sovereign, the second is that the sovereign brought the vassals to their present condition -- either earning or expressing his sovereignty in the past. Thus, I wouldn't rule out anarcho-capitalism (no state-monopoly of sanctions-imposing) based solely on one writer's formulation of a theological model. The Covenant does not require an earthly hierarchy. One of the central features of my 95 Theses on Patriarchy is the idea that all believers are to be priests, kings, and judges. There is no Biblical basis for an elite hierarchy. The non-patriarchal pedagogues of the Old Covenant were temporary. There is no Biblical justification for monopolistic imposition of "sanctions." The problem is not that someone might apply sanctions in an "unauthorized" (non-monopolistic) manner, the problem is that someone might say "Oh, that's the State's responsibility" and let a thief go "unpunished." If you believe there must be a monopoly on the imposition of sanctions, and it's better to have a thief go without making restitution than to have restitution imposed by an insurance company or voluntary association, then read no further, start a new thread on "representation/hierarchy" and state the case for elitism.

Oath/Judgment/Sanctions · I'll admit I need to do some work on this point, so challenge away. To make the point clear (and not to slander anyone or be offensive) I will take the position that there is no "punishment." Now hear me out -- don't make the mistake of allowing that to be a straw man. Restitution is not a 'punishment." It is not designed to hurt the thief, it is designed to restore the victim, to "make him whole." Likewise "capital punishment" is not a punishment. The Scripture expressly states that its purpose is to restore the land, to make the land whole by atonement, covering the guilt of innocent blood.

I'm predisposed to avoid the concept of "punishment" or "retribution" because of the clear prohibition on vengeance (Rom.12:19). Restitution is not vengeance. Atonement by bloodshed ("capital punishment") is not vengeance. Biblical sanctions are restorative, not punitive.

The only thing that seems to be a "punishment" in the ordinary sense of that term is whipping, and I know of no reconstructionist who advocates state-imposed whipping. Probably an analogy is to be drawn between obstinate resistance to the imposer of sanctions and the slave/child, who was allowed to be whipped. It's a form of pedagogy, not "punishment." It could be imposed, for example, by an employer.

Now, I've answered the questions concerning "vengeance," "retribution," "restitution,"

My next post will show how restitution/restoration is imposed in a stateless society.

Date: August 09, 2000 12:13 AM
Author: Anarcho-Kev (Kevin4VFT@aol.com)
Subject: Medieval Anarcho-Capitalism

This post answers questions about non-lethal sanctions. It suggests that sanctions such as restitution in commercial settings can be imposed fairly without "the State."

I wrote this paper in 1985. I've thrown in a few links for Ed and Fjet. I plagiarized the whole concept from a chapter called "Voluntary Justice," in a small book published by Arlington House, William C. Wooldridge, Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 1970. I padded the basic structure with a few law review articles. Later, the whole concept was picked up by Bruce Benson, and an entire book was written on "Justice without the State" -- The Enterprise of Law, Pacific Research Institute, 1990. This is a tremendous book.

The Law Merchant and The Ministry of Reconciliation
- A Proposal -

In our book, The Meaning of Vine and Fig Tree(1), we have set forth the vision of a stateless society, brought about by international regeneration and conversion to Christianity, in which the rule of God's Law is manifested in decentralized patriarchal (Family-centered) society, free from manipulated economies, orchestrated wars and shortages, and crowned by Christlike morality and service, and the world-wide restoration of Edenic conditions.

That book was revised and expanded into A Christian Conciliation Manifesto,(2), which applied the vision of Reconciliation and Peacemaking outside the State's secular systems of justice.

In this book, we show how, since the inauguration of the Kingdom at the Advent of Christ, history has been moving toward the "Vine & Fig Tree" vision. Although this progress has seen an ebb-and-flow, up-and-down character, there have been enough high points to indicate not only the movement towards an internationally decentralized human community, but -- more important to some -- the feasibility or "practicality" of a normative social vision based on the "primitive," "pre-industrial" Law of God.

Anarchism, Revolution, and Romans 13
In Volume I of our series of volumes on Patriarchy,(3) we have argued that the State, far from being a "divine institution," is actually a lawless institution which is opposed to the service-ideal of Christian morality, the Rule of Law required in Scripture, and to the Patriarchal (Family-centered) culture espoused therein.(4) In this book, we attempt to illustrate, using the principles of comparative law, how international commercial disputes may be resolved in a Stateless society.

The history of the Lex Mercatoria is a history of the international arbitration of commercial disputes in an age when the State had not yet wrapped its tentacles around spontaneous industrial arrangements and the harmonious re-adjustments of free individuals and voluntary associations. This history is viewed in light of the absolutely binding and authoritative commands of Biblical Law, notably as expressed in the Scriptural concept of "The Ministry of Reconciliation" (2 Corinthians 5:18).

America's Declaration of Independence declares that men have the right "to alter or abolish" any government which "becomes destructive" of the People's rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" and "to institute new government." Our Founding Fathers felt justified in a violent and bloody revolution against the de facto civil government of their day. We have analyzed this view and course of action in Patriarchy Vol. I, and have explicitly rejected such revolution. However, the traditional understanding of Romans 13 as legitimizing Secular Empire was also found to be utterly inconsistent with other passages of Scripture (e.g., Isaiah chapters 10 and 13), and we were led to reject the Biblical legitimacy of the concept of the "State." However, that our Founding Fathers took such violent and dedicated a stand as they did against a government which taxed at a rate of less than 5% and which wouldn't have dreamed of legalizing the wanton murder of millions of unborn people should soften the "revolutionary" character of our "anarchist" and "utopian" speculations.(5)

Forgiveness and Substantive Law
We begin by very briefly analyzing economic and commercial activity from a Biblical perspective. We both rely on and reject the analysis of the Christian Reconstructionists, notably economist Gary North.

How can we best expand our market: by cut-throat competition and sharp "caveat emptor"-type practices, or by practicing principles of self-sacrifice, abundant giving, and endeavoring to "procure, preserve, and further the wealth and outward estate of others."(6) If "capitalism" is truly "Looking Out for #1"(7) based on "The Virtue of Selfishness"(8), then Christianity is plainly opposed to "capitalism."(9) The kind of business practices we may envisage in a dominantly Christian culture would unquestionably be based on the principle of "good faith" dealing,(10) and undoubtedly would require a return to previous understandings of this concept (when Christian thought was more dominant) and then would entail significant advancement in our understanding of that concept from a Biblical perspective.(11)

Forgiveness and Procedural Law
In the event that a man of "bad faith" deals in an evil way with us, what kind of justice would we want in a Christian culture? How should we respond to the merchant who contractually smites us on the right cheek?(12) The Biblical principles of reconciliation and forgiveness clearly demand that we think more of the well-being of our neighbor, business partner, client, customer, and even competitor, than we do of ourselves.(13)

One aspect of this concern should be a desire to see a sinner repent, i.e., turn from economic lawlessness and embrace Christ in His Law.(14) And while this repentance would surely bring forth fruits of restitution(15), we must be careful to distinguish our desire for his repentance from our quest for vengeance, which is forbidden to us.(16)

Thus, a Christian theory of business, based as it must be upon the Eighth commandment, must be concerned with "avoiding unnecessary law-suits."(17) Those of us who are tempered by our times, accustomed as we are to a "litigious society,"(18) will perhaps find this perspective "unrealistic," "idealistic," or "impractical." But when viewed from the perspective of God's Covenant, we understand that only human action which is in accord with the legal principles of Scripture will be blessed according to the provisions of His Covenant with us.(19)

The Ministry of Reconciliation
Some theologians have suggested that the "church" has a "ministry of reconciliation" (i.e., of men to God) and that the "state" is a "minister of justice" (i.e., between men).(20) There is no Biblical support for this institutionalization, nor this dichotomy, nor still the characterization of the State in such positive terms. Reconciliation and justice are concerns of every man in his Family.(21) Thus, the Church or Bride of Christ is concerned with both justice and reconciliation.(22) Finally, the State is never called a "minister of justice" in Scripture. It is a minister of judgment, "the rod of mine anger," given a "command to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them (the objects of God's judgment) down like the mire of the streets" (Isaiah 10:5-6). But for these acts of war, taxation, and vengeance, the State is always destroyed (v. 12; cf. Ezekiel 25:15-17), because this behavior -- the very essence of the State -- is utterly prohibited by God's Law and is cursed according to the terms of His Covenant.(23)

A Godly society is not characterized by revenge and punitive destruction. It is characterized by economic stability and prosperity. This harmony is evidence of God's Blessing upon Godly service and faith.(24) The business dealings of a Godly Society are smooth and just, not coercive and fraudulent.

The history of the Law Merchant (Lex Mercatoria) and a comparative study of international commercial law shows that a Godly society is not one dominated by the State or by conflicting systems of national law, but by voluntary justice and Christian reconciliation.

The Law Merchant
On Monday the twelfth of May, some 699 years ago, William of Lawford had a classic business dispute with Reginald of Northampton. Agreeing on a trade for a horse at a price of five marks, Reggie offered a bolt of ray, valuable shiny cloth. Having previously agreed to pay in goods (anyone can run a printing press, but honest money (commodity) is hard to come by), Bill balked, contending that the ray could never bring five marks. Disgruntled seller, unsatisfied buyer, disagreement over the value of goods; we have everything we need for litigation.

But these men did not file with the closest King's judge. Like most merchants of their day, William of Lawford and Reginald of Northampton took advantage of private arbitration at the Fair Court of St. Ives. Speedily, fairly, the case was decided by arbitrators who knew more of merchant law than any of the King's courts. Purely voluntary, in fact, extralegal, neither the King nor Parliament imposed the rules or enforced the decisions of the Fair Court.

Yet far from novel or unique, Bill and Reggie's dispute was handled in the same way the overwhelming majority of commercial disputes were handled in that day, as it had for centuries, and would for centuries to come.(25)

The Threat to the State
As kings vied for power and control in the centuries approaching the Renaissance, the competition from non-political courts became unbearable to the State. Because judges were paid a fee for each case settled, a movement grew to usurp the powers of the voluntary courts and monopolize them in the hands of the State. Throughout Europe, the State closed the Fairs and assumed commercial law into the Common Law and Civil Law systems.(26)

Modern Fair Courts
But as the inefficiency of non free-market systems of dispute resolution became clearer, it was inevitable that voluntary systems would again emerge. When statist forces in the Northeastern portion of America resolved to destroy the (distorted) vestiges of decentralized Christian culture in the South (the War of Northern Aggression, 1861-1865), they disrupted trade and the economy. Contracts were thwarted and ships were sunk trying to run the blockade. The courts were also swamped with claims in insurance, neutrality, and contraband-of-war laws which would have taken years to untangle, and longer if the State had tried to resolve them wisely and justly(!). A voluntary association of merchants who handled the great bulk of trade (Liverpool Cotton Association) agreed to insert an arbitration clause in all their contracts. "Arbitration proved so successful in adjusting differences without the expense, inconvenience, and hard feeling of suits that other Liverpool commercial associations took up the device. . . ."(27) By 1883 a correspondent of the London Times could write that "whole trades and professions have virtually turned their back" on the courts.(28) Owen D. Young, chairman of the board of General Electric (1922-39) and RCA (till 1929) as well as chairman of the American section of the International Chamber of Commerce (1925-28), was an enthusiastic propagandist for private arbitration.(29)

The New Lex Mercatoria
Seeing its success, efficiency, low-cost, speed, and expertise, international arbitration has caught on, and has been called "the New Lex Mercatoria."(30) More commercial disputes are settled by extra-legal arbitration than in the courts of the various States.(31)

The current growth in "extra-judicial" resolution of disputes is encouraging for those with a vision of Christian Conciliation. But equally encouraging is a long history of law which saw the "free-market" work harmoniously without coercive intervention from the State.

Our vision of a reconstructed society is greatly aided by a close scrutiny of oft-neglected manifestations of Godly economics and law which have occurred throughout history.
Micah's "Vine & Fig Tree" vision
Creationist Anarcho-Socialism

1. [note omitted]

International Regeneration

Patriarchy

Christlike morality

2.[note omitted]

3.[note omitted] Click here.

4. [note omitted]

5. See the essay, "Unlucky 13, &c.," which follows the outline mentioned in note 4.

6. ". . . as well as our own." Westminster Larger Catechism, Q. 141.

7. Number One best-seller by Robert J. Ringer, New York: Fawcett Crest Books, 1977.

8. Subtitled , "A New Concept of Egoism," by Ayn Rand, New York: Signet Books, 1964.

9. See Volume V of the PATRIARCHY series, as well as the Vine & Fig Tree Studyletter, THE DEBT PAPERS.

10. Powell, Raphael, "Good Faith in Contracts," 9 Current Legal Problems 16 (1956); Holmes, Eric M., "A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good Faith Disclosure in Contract Formation," 39 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 381 (1978).

11. Ours is a Theonomic defintion of "faith": "By this faith, a Christian believeth to be true whatsoever is revealed in the Word, for the authority of God Himself speaking therein; and acteth differently upon that which each particular passage thereof containeth; yielding obedience to the commands, trembling at the threatenings, and embracing the promises of God for this life, and that which is to come." (Westminster Confession of Faith, "Of Saving Faith," XIV:ii.

12. Matthew 5:39-42.

13. WLC Qq. 131-132; Philp. 2:3-4; Romans 12:10; Eph. 5:21.

14. "By it (repentance), a sinner . . . so grieves for, and hates his sins, as to turn from them all unto God, purposing and endeavoring to walk with Him in all the ways of his Commandments." WCF, "Of Repentance Unto Life," XV:ii.

15. Exodus 22:1-17; Luke 19:8-9.

16. See our essay, "The Legal Pimp," attached to this proposal.

17. See the exposition of the Eighth Commandment in The Larger Catechism, Q.141.

18. Jethro K. Lieberman, New York: Basic Books, (1981).

19. Deuteronomy 28:1-14; see Ray R. Sutton, That You May Prosper: Dominion By Covenant, Tyler, TX: Institute for Christian Economics, (1987).

20. Gary North, Unconditional Surrender, Tyler, TX: Geneva Press, (1981), p. 130.

21. Genesis 18:19; 26:5; Proverbs 1:3; Jeremiah 22:15-16.

22. 2 Corinthians 5:18-19; Matthew 23:23; John 16:7-11.

23. Romans 12:17-21; I Samuel 8:7; 10:19; 12:17; Deut. 28:15-68; Matt. 26:52.

24. See the extract from the essay, "Angels and God's Throne of Government," attached to this proposal.

25. Hundreds of similar cases are recorded in the publications of the Seldon Society, Select Cases Concerning the Law Merchant, 3 vols., 1908, 1930, 1932.

26. S. Todd Lowry, "Lord Mansfield and the Law Merchant: Law and Economics in the Eighteenth Century," 7 Journal of Economic Issues 605 (1973). Bernardo M. Cremades and Steven L. Plehn add, "As the modern nation-state developed during the sixteenth century, rulers of sovereign states began to regard the autonomous Lex Mercatoria as an external threat to internal cohesiveness." ("The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the Laws of International Commercial Transactions," 2 Boston University International Law Journal 317, 319 (1984).

27. William C. Wooldridge, "Voluntary Justice," in Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 1970, p. 99.

28. See Samuel Rosenbaum's note in A Report on Commercial Arbitration, (American Judicature Society, Oct. 1916).

29. Wooldridge, p. 101.

30. Leon E. Trakman, "The Evolution of the Law Merchant: Our Commercial Heritage," 12 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 173ff. (1981); Cremades & Plehn, supra. note 26; Ole Lando, "The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration," 34 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 747 (1985).

31. Yves Derains, "New Trends in the Practical Application of the ICC Rules of Arbitration," 3 International Law and Business 39 (1981).

Lex Mercatoria and H diakonia thV kataggaghV

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Date: August 09, 2000 02:30 PM
Author: Anarcho-Kev (Kevin4VFT@aol.com)
Subject: Justice: The Overlooked Monopoly

I have always enjoyed playing the game of Monopoly -- so long as I win. Hotels on Boardwalk and Park Place are great fun, but only if I own them. When someone else has them, they cause great stress, anxiety, and even fear as I turn down that final stretch of the playing board before collecting $200.

No one likes to be in the clutches of a monopolist: someone who has cornered the market on a particular product or service. A monopolist's control leaves the "other guys" feeling strangled. It is difficult for them to tap sufficient resources and gain enough power to compete in the game.

Many such monopolies have existed in our country, but most of them eventually make their exclusive ownership too evident and attract the attention of "trust busters." But there is one monopoly in our nation that everyone seems to have overlooked, and its product is justice. The legal profession has succeeded in convincing the American public that it takes a law degree to do justice, The profession's success has been tremendous and the cost monumental. Last year, billions of dollars were spent to resolve disputes as 17 million Americans took a trip to the courthouse. The monopoly has reached such proportions that it must be broken up.

Christ was faced with a similar situation in His own day. He responded by warning lawyers in the strongest possible terms, "Woe to you lawyers! For you have taken away the keys of knowledge; you did not enter in yourselves, and those who were entering you hindered" (Luke 11:52). Apparently the lawyers thought they had exclusive possession of the keys to the system. Christ did not approve, and we should not either.

Yet most Americans assume that pursuing justice is out of their realm. Without a law degree, they think they are unqualified "judges" and that dispute resolution is best left exclusively to the courts and the lawyers. But alternate dispute resolution options do exist, and the legal profession needs to be out front, informing and equipping non-lawyers with the keys to exercise these options.

The Christian Legal Society has taken steps to show Christians and the secular world that there are viable alternatives. Under the able leadership of Laury Eck, the Christian Conciliation Service (CCS). a ministry of CLS, has proven itself an effective option for the last six years. CCS gives non-lawyers, such as pastors and other lay people, the, "keys of knowledge" necessary for them to help resolve disputes without litigation. In 1985, the 30 CCS chapters across the country helped resolve over 2,000 disputes. We estimate that this saved the church nearly $10 million in legal fees and other costs. Undoubtedly, it also saved our court system and the taxpayers an equal amount.

Working alongside the legal profession, it is time for the Christian community to actively support alternatives to resolving disputes in the pursuit of justice. The game of monopoly belongs in the family room, not in the courtroom.

This article appeared sometime in the 1980's. Sam Ericcson was President of the Christian Legal Society.

Date: August 09, 2000 04:24 PM
Author: Anarcho-Kev (Kevin4VFT@aol.com)
Subject: Justice without "the State"

To Serve and Protect
Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice

by Bruce L. Benson
Foreword by Marvin E Wolfgang

New York University Press, 1998
CU7744, Hardcover, 372 pages

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Justice without government

Government does a poor job protecting people against crime, yet zealously protects its monopoly of police and criminal justice.

Now comes this superb book, a worthy successor to Benson's The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without The State (1990). Because he mounts a formidable challenge to the most fundamental rationale for having a government, the book is more interesting than most other books we've seen on crime.

Benson reviews evidence that government has been unable to do much about crime. Police solve very few crimes all by themselves--tips are the key. He cites statistics showing that increasing the number of squad cars or police on the beat, or even faster police response rates, have little effect on crime rates.

Benson expresses anger at the failure of the government's criminal justice system to help victims. Criminals can plead for mercy after their conviction, but victims are never allowed any input in the process. Victims can only be heard by talking to reporters or forming victims' rights groups. The government has displayed little interest in making victims once again as whole as possible.

One of the most valuable parts of this book is Benson's thoughtful discussion of a restitution-based system of criminal justice. This, he emphasizes, would probably help deter crime, but the main point is to do right by the victims. He comments on the ideas of Murray Rothbard, Robert Bidinotto, and others emphasizing the importance of restitution. Benson addresses the difficulties of collecting money from cash-poor criminals. He analyzes the workings of restitution-based systems around the world.

If you enjoyed The Enterprise of Law, which provided a revealing history of private methods for resolving disputes, you'll certainly relish the perspective this book offers. As University of Pennsylvania criminologist Wolfgang puts it in the foreword, To Serve and Protect shows that "government law enforcement was not the norm in the original thirteen colonies. Moreover, we are told, there is a growing literature that is concluding that the frontier West in the nineteenth century was not very violent, that it 'was a far more civilized, more peaceful and safer place than American society today,' mostly because there was private justice that did not offend the values of democratic processes. Hence, the American West of that century was not lawless, it was 'stateless.'"

Many of you will be surprised to hear Benson say, "The historical reality of crime policy is that public provision of criminal justice is a recent social experiment that has not worked as predicted. The increasing role of private security that we see today is actually a return to historical practices rather than something new, although private sector institutions and technologies have changed dramatically as entrepreneurs have discovered new ways to deliver the desired protection. . . . One survey indicates that nearly half of all business security managers investigate and resolve employee thefts within the business organization without ever reporting the crime."

Benson documents the trend to privatizing crime reporting, law enforcement, mediation, prosecution, restitution, and prison management. An important contribution.

Date: August 12, 2000 01:27 AM
Author: Anarcho-Kev (Kevin4VFT@aol.com)
Subject: Anarcho-Theonomic Civil Courts

Wherever there is a government monopoly, there is inefficiency, bad service, and an opportunity for profits. The most publicized such monopoly is the Post Office. There the advancing forces of capitalism have forced the government monopoly, in spite of its massive federal subsidy, to take legal action to limit private competitors.

There exists a government monopoly bigger and more inefficient than the Post Office. It is a service industry run so inefficiently that customers frequently wait in line for years before receiving any attention and spend years more waiting for the government to finish a job that should require a week or two. It is not surprising that 80 to 90 percent of the customers give up, go home, and do the work themselves.

I refer, of course, to the service of arbitrating and enforcing private contracts. This service is now performed primarily by the civil courts. It could be performed better by private institutions. Sometimes it is.

Those who compete with the courts in this business are called arbitrators; the largest organization in the business is, I believe, the American Arbitration Association. Corporations, especially those operating internationally and therefore subject to the complications of international law sign contracts in which they agree that any dispute over the meaning of the contract will be arbitrated by the AAA. Normally, such contracts cover matters where it is more important that a decision be immediate than what the decision is. If such a matter goes to court, both parties will forget what the disagreement was about long before the case is settled. Arbitration provides a faster and cheaper way of resolving such disputes.

Arbitration arrangements without some enforcement mechanism are a satisfactory substitute for the courts when the problem is merely an honest disagreement and the matter being settled is less important than continued good relations between the two parties. In other cases, arbitration may be unsatisfactory if the arbitrator, unlike the court, has no way of enforcing his decisions. If one party refuses to accept a decision, the other's only recourse is to go to court in the hope that the settlement, when it finally comes through, will be of some use to his grandchildren.

A large part of the potential business for arbitration involves contracts for which some enforcement mechanism is needed. An entrepreneur able to provide such enforceable arbitration should be able to make a great deal of money. Billions are spent now on buying the same service from the court system; a good private institution should be able to turn a substantial fraction of those billions into profits.

I can think of two ways in which such enforceable arbitration could be provided without involving the government court system. Both require that arbitration agencies, like present arbitrators, not only have a reputation for being no more corrupt than the courts, but go far beyond this, to the point of being known to be positively honest. There is evidence that corporations with such a reputation will develop if there is a market for them. Some years ago, for instance, American Express assumed someone else's debt, amounting to a substantial fraction of its profits for that year, although it had no legal responsibility to do so. American Express did so because it was arguable that American Express was morally responsible, and since the firm is in the business of producing money (which it does much better than the government, incidentally), its reputation for scrupulous honesty was worth more to the company than the cost of assuming the debt.

The first method of enforcement would be for the two contracting parties to turn over to the arbitration firm a sum equal to the maximum penalty provided for under the contract. The arbitration firm would have complete discretion to do what it wished with the money. In case of a breach of contract, it would allocate an appropriate amount of one firm's money to the other. When the contract expired, it would return the money, plus interest, to the contracting parties, after deducting a prearranged fee. There would be no court-enforced contract between the contracting firms and the arbitrator; there would thus be no legal bar to prevent the arbitration firm from keeping both deposits for itself -- once.

The second form of enforcement is already in use, although not by arbitration firms. In its present form it is called a credit rating. Any firm which agreed to have a contract arbitrated and then refused to go along with the arbitration would be 'blacklisted' by the arbitration agency -- forbidden to use its services again. Before two firms signed an arbitration agreement, each would first check with all the reputable arbitration agencies to make sure the other firm was not on such a blacklist, since there would be little point in signing an arbitration agreement with a firm that had reneged on such agreements in the past. Thus a blacklisted firm would be forced to make its contract enforceable in the courts instead of by arbitration. With the courts as bad as they now are, the unavailability of the arbitration mechanism would be a serious cost. Thus the threat of blacklisting would be an effective sanction to enforce compliance with arbitrated contracts.

Under such a system there would develop two sorts of firms, those that had virtually all their contracts arbitrated and had a reputation of always abiding by the arbitration and those that used court-enforced contracts instead. The first group would have an obvious competitive advantage. Honesty does pay.

Such free enterprise mechanisms need not be limited to civil cases involving explicit contracts. Many personal injury cases could be covered by arbitration agreements among insurance companies, as could other kinds of civil cases. To some extent this already happens; present insurance companies not only provide the service of pooling their customers' risks, but also provide, by negotiations among themselves aimed at settling out of court and thus avoiding legal costs, a partial substitute for the courts. This job could perhaps be done better by firms whose sole business was such arbitration.

A potential arbitrator has a multibillion dollar market now almost completely in the hands of a government monopoly selling low quality services at an exorbitant price. All you need to go into business is honesty, ingenuity, hard work, and luck.

Date: August 12, 2000 05:10 PM
Author: FjetF (bojidar@mail.vega.bg)
Subject: Kevin still doesn't answer Ed's question

I was patiently waiting several days for Kevin to deliver a real-world answer to Ed's real world question. Instead of answering the question, Kevin followed his usual way of pouring thousands of hyperlinks and cheap propaganda that has nothing to do with Ed's question, slandering the Covenantal Theonomic Reconstructionists for being statists, elitists, and other epithets that are part of the anarcho-pacifist propagandist garbage.

Though most of what Kevin presented on this site doesn't have anything to do with Ed's question, I will comment on all of it, commenting under several subheadings in order to make my response better understandable.

Now, it is still unsure: Does Kevin believe in the capital sanction prescribed in the Law of God, or not? In one place he says everyone can impose sanctions, therefore there is no reason to restrict the bloodshedding to the State alone. But in another place he claims there can be no capital punishment in the New Testament. How does that answer Ed's question: WHO PUNISHES THE KILLER FOR HIS CRIMES? Everyone can do it? Or no one can do it? Kevin's confounded arguments seem to defend both conclusions. What to do then?

Of course, Kevin is not so mad to believe everyone can impose capital sanction. (Or am I mistaken?) If everyone can impose capital sanctions, there is no basis for the social order, because in a less than ideal world people always differ as to how the Law of God must be interpreted; also, again in a less than ideal world there is never sufficient information and people will always differ as to whether this particular person has really committed this crime.

The opposite argument - no capital punishment in the New Testament - is defended by Kevin on the basis of the statement that in the Old Testament the capital punishment was ritual bloodsheding for cleansing the land. Therefore, infers Kevin, in the New Testament, since Christ has made an atonement for all the sins by offering the ultimate sacrifice, we must not restore the cleansing rituals of the Old Testament.

Now, this argument is based on Kevin's exclusivist interpretation of the function of the capital punishment: in Kevin's twisted imagination it has ONLY a religious function of ritual cleansing and nothing else. (I would remind here that all heresies rely on similar exclusivist interpretations.) But there is no evidence that capital punishment in the Law of God has ONLY one function and no other functions, like keeping the society free from wandering murderers, adulterers, kidnappers, etc. Several verses in Deuteronomy require death penalty for the reason of "so shalt thou put evil away from among you": Deut. 13:5; 17:7; 19:19; 21:21; 22:21, 24; 24:7. The reason so stated clearly indicates that the capital punishment required has as its goal not only ritual cleansing of the land, but also civil cleansing of society, i.e., God wants His world to be free of people that have violated His Law with the highest violations. To say that in the New Testament capital punishment is not required is to say that God is not concerned about "putting evil away from among His people."

In his web-site Kevin presents an argument drawn from Deut. 21:1-9, where it says that when there is an unsolved murder, the city must be cleansed by sacrificing a heifer for cleansing of the land. Kevin infers from this that the capital punishment was ONLY a religious ritual in the Old Testament, and asks: "Do we believe that the mayor must sacrifice a heifer for every unsolved murder today?"

This is a fallacious argument. My response is: What if after they have sacrificed the heifer someone presents proofs and testimonies about who the murderer is? The ritual cleansing of the land has been already done. Does Kevin believe that under the Old Testament Law the murderer would go unpunished just because the land is already ritually cleansed? If no, why should there be a second ritual cleansing of the land? If yes, then Kevin is simply a heretic.

When it comes to lesser crimes, Kevin poses a false dichotomy: God's Law is not after punishing the criminal, but after restoring the victim.

Biblical point is this: The sanctions of the Law of God are indeed concerned more with the restitution to the victim, but they also contain punishment to the criminal. We can't separate restitution from punishment. To do so is kind of Kantian dualism in the legal world. When I pointed out that this principle is evident in the fact that double restitution is required from the thief, Kevin evaded my argument by these words:

Kevin deliberately twists the Biblical meaning. Double restitution is the general sanction prescribed in the Law. One-fifth, quadruple and quintuple restitution are only imposed in some individual specific cases. Obviously, double restitution is the standard and it contains in itself both the restitution to the victim and the punishment to the criminal - i.e., the criminal must suffer what he wanted to inflict to the other party, which is another principle of the Law of God. The statement that the amount of the restitution is based on the inconvenience to the victim reveals that Kevin hasn't done his homework in studying more economics - there is no possible way to estimate the inconvenience to the victim, unless you believe in the possibility for humans to exactly establish some kind of objective economic value.

But why shouldn't we say that the capital punishment is a kind of a restitution payment to the ultimate Victim, God? Kevin doesn't answer this question, and this is defended by Gary North in his Tools of Dominion, Chapter 11, "Criminal Law and Restoration," pp. 403-404.

Another question arises: If capital punishment is valid no more, why should we believe other punishments are valid? If Christ made the ultimate death restitution on the Cross, abolishing the death penalty, why didn't He abolish all the sacntions that include some kind of restitution, like restitution for theft or negligence? Based on Kevin's view on the capital punishment we can say that economic restitution had only a ritual function in the Old Testament, therefore it is also abolished on the Cross.

Kevin's arguments are based on a number of false dichotomies like the following:

I will only say that such dichotomies are false. It is both. The Bible contains both the concern for restoration and the punishment.

Also as whole Kevin expresses his disbelief that imposing the just sanctions of the Law of God today can't help the evangelism and the repentance of the sinner. Somehow if we impose the sanctions of the Law of God that will restrain the sinner from repentance. But what does the Bible say? When presenting all the commandments and the sanctions of the Law of God, Moses says:

Let's summarize. Moses believes that the Law and all its statutes and judgments are evangelistic tools. Kevin believes that the Law's judgments can not be evangelistic tools. Guess who's the heretic.

Eventually Kevin doesn't explain how we will punish the killer. He doesn't even explain how we will punish the thief. His arguments and the arguments of his fellow-utopists only touch the true problem with the crime: criminals who won't stop doing crimes unless they are forced to do it. In this regard their arguments only reveal their childishness - in mind, not in malice, cf. 1 Cor. 14:20 - and their lack of understanding of the nature of social and economic order as well as of the mind and motivation of the criminal.

Now, if we are talking ONLY about "criminals" that are so concerned about the approval of their fellow men, there is no dispute at all! In such a society we don't need sanctions at all. There won't be ANY criminals at all. If EVERYONE doesn't sleep at night wondering whether he had done something the previous day to injure his reputation, then I am the first to require the abolishment of any sanctions and any government! Why, even if we retain the sanctions in our society's law-books, there wouldn't be any need for them and they won't be executed. No problem about it! I wonder, why does Kevin need to tread that much on this?

In the "Law Merchant" article Kevin gives the childish example of William and Reginald who would rather go to the private court to solve their dispute than to the state. I have yet to meet any Reconstructionist that advocates the compulsive intervention of the State to solve such disputes. (I understand that Kevin needs to create such imaginary opponent for his arguments, but there is no such person in the real world.) I don't have problem about the private courts when both parties agree to go to them and obey their decision. Neither does any of the leading Reconstructionists. Actually, if I have any problem about Kevin's infantilist example, it is exactly the opposite: why should they go to the court and spend money there? In the real economic world if the parties don't agree they just part away and that's it! Then everyone tries to find someone with whom he might agree on the price. Not only William and Reginald didn't need the State to solve their dispute, they didn't need the Law Mercantoria either. All they needed was Adam Smith.

But there are some criminals in the world that is less ideal than Kevin's world that not only do not care about people's opinion about them, but would rather become the more arrogant and audacious the more they can go without punishment. These are the criminals Kevin prefers not to include in his analysis. When it comes to their punishment, he is silent. When it comes to the restoration of their victims, Kevin is silent.

This is the nature of Kevin's system of justice and restoration: the criminals are well out with the spoils, the victims get screwed. The only thing the victims can do is to trust in the good-will of the criminals that someday they will return back what they have stolen.

Now, I don't have problem about individuals that refuse to sue criminals because they believe they can't require forceful returning of their property in the New Testament. But what happens to a society that has allowed the professional criminals to go with the spoils and never force them to return what they've stolen?

The participants on the market will have to include the risk of being robbed in the prices of their products. Since they don't have any possibility to force the criminals - unless the criminals are the sweety-gushy type criminals of Kevin's imagination - to pay restitution, the increase in prices due to the risks will be high enough to ensure stagnation. It is true that the government intervention does bring stagnation too, but the lack of effective sanctions against criminals also brings stagnation. For the last ten years in my country I've seen both. (And, by the way, in spite of Kevin's slanders, no Reconstructionist advocates centralized government with heavy national budget and professional police force.) Capitalism requires most of all predictability, and there can't be much predictability in a world without effective sanctions against professional criminals. (Of course, to say it again, in a world without criminals or Kevin's imagined type of criminals the predictability of the social order is perfect even without effective sanctions.)

Kevin still insists to depict us all as the ultimate statists, socialists, police-state defenders, advocates of centralized government, Janet Reno's agents. He must do so to defend his crippled illusions.

Even if nothing else is said, Kevin's slanders are sufficient to show the true nature of the "Christian" pacifism.

He also accused me of being pessimist concerning the ultimate victory of the Kingdom of God in history. My reply: Just because I see that the world is less than ideal today doesn't mean I don't believe in the historical victory of the Kingdom of God.

Date: August 13, 2000 04:32 AM
Author: Anarcho-Kev (Kevin4VFT@aol.com)
Subject: Some Answers for FJet

Date: August 13, 2000 08:24 PM
Author: Lurquer (comunicus@hotmail.com)
Subject: A Question for Anarcho-Kevin

It is true you have based at least part of your argument on the fact that the ONLY purpose (you have sense modified this to PRIMARY purpose) of the death penalty was for atonement.

Ed has cited numerous verses along the lines of "ridding the land of evil" to support the notion that such a penalty was chiefly with an eye towards lessening crime by getting rid of repeat offenders.

For linguistic reasons, which have been pointed out to Ed before, I don't think the phrase means quite what he wants it to in Hebrew.

And the man that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the priest that standeth to minister there before the LORD thy God, or unto the judge, even that man shall die: and thou shalt put away the evil from Israel. And all the people shall hear, and fear, and do no more presumptuously.

Now.... Here we have -- clear as day -- an acknowledgment that the death penalty had deterrence as a purpose; criminals were killed in order to make others think twice before breaking the law. "The people shall, hear, fear, and do no more presumptuously." George Bush himself couldn't have said it better.

So, Mr. Atonement-only, there you have it --- the death penalty may be used for deterrence. Sure, there might be an atonement purpose as well, and sure that was fulfilled with Christ, but the Mosaic law STILL authorizes the death penalty for deterrence. And, nobody in the N.T. ever said we were not to kill people in order to deter others.

So while you are trotting your unknown-murderer-heifer around, could you take some time to address the above?

(See, FJet how easy it is to make devestatingly brilliant counter-arguments without resorting to name-calling?)

Date: August 14, 2000 01:38 AM
Author: anon (anon)
Subject: Is this really Anarcho-Kevin?

It is amazing that the anarchist, feminist, animal rights, eco-nazi's did not kill this guy......maybe it was because they were all busy inside.

Answers for Real Questions				Anarcho-Kev	08/08/00
If you bothered to answer my questions...				Ed Burley	08/08/00
	The answers to your questions			Anarcho-Kev	08/08/00
		I'm done		Ed Burley	08/08/00
		Unable to present consistent arguments		FjetF	08/08/00
			one simple question	Lurquer	08/09/00
	Ed & FJet are Thilly			Anarcho-Kev	08/08/00
Sanctions, Monopoly, and Vengeance				Anarcho-Kev	08/09/00
Everybody is a State for himself				FjetF	08/09/00
	Everyone is a Patriarch for God			Anarcho-Kev	08/09/00
Medieval Anarcho-Capitalism				Anarcho-Kev	08/09/00
Justice: The Overlooked Monopoly				Anarcho-Kev	08/09/00
Justice without "the State"				Anarcho-Kev	08/09/00
Anarcho-Theonomic Civil Courts				Anarcho-Kev	08/12/00
Kevin still doesn't answer Ed's question				FjetF	08/12/00
What's the big deal here?				Lurquer	08/13/00
Some Answers for FJet				Anarcho-Kev	08/13/00
A Question for Anarcho-Kevin				Lurquer	08/13/00
Some suggested answers				Anarcho-Kev	08/14/00
Is this really Anarcho-Kevin?				anon	08/14/00

Sanctions in an Anarcho-Capitalist Theonomic Utopia

The Law Merchant and The Ministry of Reconciliation - A Proposal -

Lex Mercatoria and H diakonia thV kataggaghV

Bibliography

Justice without government

The Law Merchant and The Ministry of Reconciliation
- A Proposal -